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Abstract 
This paper modifies the standard tort model by introducing role-type uncertainty, that is, 
it is assumed that neither party knows in advance whether she will become the victim or 
the injurer when an accident occurs.  When the standards of care of the two parties are 
assumed to be set at the socially optimal levels, only pure comparative negligence and the 
equal division rule guarantee efficiency, while the rules of simple negligence, 
contributory negligence, and comparative negligence with fixed division (other than a 
50:50 split) produce the possibility of inefficient equilibria. Since the pure comparative 
negligence rule splits liability between negligent parties according to each party’s degree 
of fault, it makes the accident loss division independent of one’s role-type.  This produces 
a social efficiency advantage.  We also extend the model to the choice of vehicle size, as 
a factor determining who will be the injurer and who the victim in motor vehicle 
collisions.  In the extension we analyze various negligence-based liability rules, and tax 
rules, as instruments for mitigating the vehicle size “arms race.”  
 
Keywords:  role-type uncertainty, negligence, comparative negligence, contributory 
negligence, equal division rule, motor vehicle collisions, vehicle size. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
One of the stylized features of the standard economic model of tort law is that each 
party’s potential role as a victim or an injurer in a possible accident is pre-determined. 
That is, each knows in advance the position - victim or injurer - she will be in if an 
accident occurs.  This setup is consistent with some types of torts, such as product 
liability or medical malpractice, but it doesn’t fit some other types of torts, like 
automobile accidents.
1   
Arlen (1990) extends the standard analysis to the “bilateral risk” situation in which 
injurers as well as victims suffer accident damages.
2   She shows that if each party is 
allowed to sue her counterpart for her own damages, the main implications of the basic 
model remain intact.  That is, various forms of negligence-based rules
3 induce  both 
parties to take efficient levels of care if the standard of care for each party is set equal to 
the socially efficient level.   
In her model, however, the proportion of total damages each party would suffer 
from an accident is known in advance.  Landes and Posner (1987, p.77) and Wittman et 
al. (1997) make the same assumption in dealing with the theory of bilateral risk 
accidents.
4  However, this may not be a satisfactory way to capture the essence of role-
type uncertainty.  In some cases, uncertainty about whether one will be the victim or the 
injurer is central. 
                                                           
1  According to the study of the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, automobile 
accidents or property liability claims accounted for more than 75% of all tort filings in state courts between 
July 1, 1991 and June 30, 1992.  Medical malpractice, product liability, and toxic substances together 
comprised about 10% of all the cases filed.  See Cooter and Ulen (2000, pp.356-357).  Huber (1988) 
estimated that traffic accident claims account for around 40% of all tort cases.   
 
2 Note that a unilateral risk model with role-type uncertainty is in essence similar to a bilateral risk model, 
if we assume that everyone is entitled to sue the other party for his own damages from an accident.  In other 
words, the situation where we know that the victim suffers the whole damages but do not know who will be 
the victim, is analytically similar to the situation where we know both can suffer damages but do not know 
what the proportions will be.  
 
3 Arlen (1990) does not include comparative negligence in her analysis, but the application of the model to 
comparative negligence is straightforward. 
  
4  White (1989) has a different approach for modeling automobile accidents cases, along the lines of 
Diamond (1974).  Rather than considering gaming behavior between the two parties involved, she focuses 
on the representative driver’s behavior, assuming that the other driver’s care level is randomly chosen from 
a population.  Her analysis also includes uncertainty in the court’s decision-making, as well as role-type 
uncertainty.   
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This paper modifies the standard tort model by introducing role-type uncertainty. 
That is, neither party knows in advance whether she will be the victim or the injurer when 
an accident occurs.  With imperfect information, each party makes choices based on a 
subjective belief about the probability that she will be the victim.  The sum of the two 
parties’ subjective victimization probabilities is not necessarily equal to 1.   
In section 2 of this paper we show that, if the two victimization probabilities do not 
sum to 1, pure comparative negligence has better efficiency properties than other 
negligence-based rules.  We show that role-type uncertainty enhances the efficiency 
claim of pure comparative negligence because it makes the liability assignment between 
two negligent parties independent of their role-types.  In particular, we show that when 
standards of care are set at socially optimal levels, only the pure comparative negligence 
rule and the equal division rule guarantee efficiency, given role-type uncertainty.  In 
contrast, the rules of simple negligence, negligence with contributory negligence as a 
defense (henceforth “contributory negligence”), and comparative negligence with a fixed 
division other than 50:50, all allow the possibility of inefficient equilibria in which both 
parties take insufficient care. 
In section 3 of the paper we extend the model to a theory of negligence and choice 
of vehicle size. In this section there is again role-type uncertainty, but this is a theory of 
motor vehicle collisions, where one’s probability of being the injurer depends on the size 
of one’s vehicle.  Drivers of big cars are more likely to be injurers, drivers of small cars, 
victims.  The general conclusion of the section 3 model is that all the standard 
negligence-based liability rules we examine produce efficient equilibria in terms of the 
parties’ care levels, but all produce an inefficient “arms race” (in White’s (2003) phrase) 
in terms of vehicle size.  We indicate how creating a size-based standard of care could 
ameliorate the inefficiency, and we compare that policy to the imposition of a vehicle 
size tax. 
2   EFFICIENT LIABILITY RULES UNDER ROLE-TYPE UNCERTAINTY 
2.1   The Model 
Suppose that there are two risk-neutral people, X and Y, who engage in some activity that 
creates a risk of accidents.  If an accident occurs, there is one victim, who suffers a  
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monetary loss  0 > L .  The loss L is assumed to be constant.  But there is uncertainty 
regarding the roles of  X and Y in the possible accident: neither knows in advance whether 
she will be the victim or the injurer.  We assume that each party has a subjective belief 
about the likelihood that she will be the victim or the injurer.  We define: 
≡ α  Person  X ’s subjective probability that she will be the victim  ). 1 0 ( ≤ ≤α  
≡ β  Person  Y ’s subjective probability that she will be the victim  ). 1 0 ( ≤ ≤ β  
Note that since these are subjective probabilities, formed ex ante, the sum of α and 
β need not be equal to 1.
5  It will turn out that the value of  β α +  has a crucial role in 
determining game equilibria, and the efficiency, or lack thereof, of some liability rules.  
Let x and  y  denote person X’s and person Y’s care levels, respectively, measured 
by their care expenditures.  Following the standard modeling in the tort liability literature 
since Brown (1973), we assume that each person can choose any level of care between 0 
and ∞, and that the probability of an accident ( )) , ( y x p ≡  is defined continuously for 
every possible combination of care levels chosen by each person.  Increasing care levels 
reduce the probability of an accident, and thus the expected accident cost ( 0 < x p , 
0 < y p ).  We also assume that, for all x and y, 0 > xx p , 0 > yy p , 0 > xy p , and 
0
2 > − xy yy xx p p p . To insure an interior solution, we assume that, for all x and y,  
1 ) , 0 ( − < y px  and  1 ) 0 , ( − < x py .  For simplicity, we assume further that the care level a 
party takes does not affect her subjective probability of being the victim (or the injurer).
6   
Total social cost (TSC) is defined as the sum of care-taking costs of both parties and 
expected accident costs.  That is, TSC =  L y x p y x ) , ( + + . The social goal is, as usual, to 
minimize total social cost.  Let (
* *, y x ) denote the solution to this TSC minimization 
                                                           
5 For example, in the context of automobile collision cases, each driver’s car is different in terms of its 
weight, bumper height, etc.  Each driver may not know in advance with whom she will collide.  A Hummer 
driver may expect that her probability of being the victim in a collision with another car will be small.  If 
two Hummer drivers are involved in a collision,  β α +  may be much less than one.  However, if the 
drivers do know with whom they will collide, then it is plausible that  β α +  will equal 1; see section 3 
below. 
 
6 This implies, for example, as a driver reduces her speed, both the probability of hitting other cars and the 
probability of being hit by other cars are expected to decline by the same degree.  This assumption can be 
relaxed without changing the main implication of this section of this section.   
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problem.  By the assumptions on the  ) , ( y x p  function, the efficient (
* *, y x ) is unique and 
strictly positive. 
When an accident occurs, the entire loss L is initially born by the victim.  The 
court then enforces a liability rule, which determines where L ultimately falls: on the 
victim, on the injurer, or on both.  A negligence-based liability rule is defined in terms of 
which parties are negligent, and if both are negligent, possibly their degrees of 
negligence.  A party is negligent if her care expenditure falls short of the court-enforced 
standard of care.  We assume that everyone, including the court, knows the expected loss 
function and the governing liability rule, that the court can solve the TSC minimization 
problem, and that everyone, including the court, can observe each party’s care level 
accurately.  We assume that the standard of care for each party is set at the socially 
optimal level. That is, for instance, party X is found negligent by the court if and only if 
she spends 
* x x < .
7 
We will analyze and compare the rules of simple negligence (section 2.2 below), 
contributory negligence (section 2.3), comparative negligence with fixed division 
(section 2.4), and pure comparative negligence (section 2.5).  These rules are 
distinguished by their ways of assigning liability when (and only when) both the victim 
and the injurer are negligent.  In other cases, all the liability rules listed above share the 
following characteristics: 
(i)   If neither the victim nor the injurer is negligent, all accident costs fall on the victim.  
(ii)  If the victim is non-negligent and the injurer is negligent, all accident costs fall on the 
injurer. 
(iii) If the victim is negligent and the injurer is non-negligent, all accident costs fall on 
the victim. 
 
                                                           
7 Note that the assumptions that the court knows the expected loss function, and sets the standard of care at 
the efficient levels (
* *, y x ), are exceedingly strong; we argue elsewhere that these assumptions, which are 
standard in the literature, are actually unrealistic.  See Kim (2003) and Feldman and Kim (2003).  
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From the above three properties, person X’s expected personal cost ( X C ≡ ) under 
role-type uncertainty can be calculated as a function of both parties’ care levels as 
follows:  
If 
* x x ≥  and 
* y y ≥ , then  L y x p   x x L y x p x CX ) , ( ) 1 ( ) ) , ( ( α α α + = − + + =     (1) 
If 
* x x <  and 
* y y ≥ , then  L y x p x L y x p x L y x p x CX ) , ( ) ) , ( )( 1 ( ) ) , ( ( + = + − + + = α α    (2) 
If 
* x x ≥  and 
* y y < , then  x x x CX = − + = ) 1 ( α α           ( 3 )  
If 
* x x <  and 
* y y < , then  X C  varies from rule to rule.  
Person Y’s expected personal cost function ( Y C ≡ ) is derived in a similar way.  
Equations (1) through (3) enable us to establish that, as in the standard model with pre-
determined role-type, the social optimum (
* *, y x ) is a Nash equilibrium even with role-
type uncertainty, under the four liability rules.  The result is Lemma 1 below. Closely 
related Lemma 2 says that under the four liability rules, there is no Nash equilibrium that 
involves either party taking more than due care, that is, spending more than her efficient 
* x or 
* y .  Proofs of both lemmas are in the Appendix. 
Lemma 1.  With role-type uncertainty, the social optimum  ) , (
* * y x  i s  a  N a s h  
equilibrium under the rules of simple negligence, contributory negligence, 
comparative negligence with fixed division, and pure comparative negligence. 
Lemma 2. With role-type uncertainty, nobody takes more than due care, at any 
possible Nash equilibrium, under the rules of simple negligence, contributory 
negligence, comparative negligence with fixed division, and pure comparative 
negligence. 
Lemmas 1 and 2 do not rule out the possibility of a Nash equilibrium in which both 
parties take less than due care.  Since each negligence-based rule specifies a different 
liability assignment in this case, the parties’ expected cost functions vary from rule to 
rule.  If one of the four liability rules could successfully rule out the possibility of an 
insufficient-care-equilibrium, then (
* *, y x ) would turn out to be the unique equilibrium of 
the game, and we could conclude that the rule would be efficient in the presence of role- 
  6
type uncertainty.  With this in mind, we examine each of the four negligence-based rules 
in turn. 
2.2   Simple  Negligence 
The simple negligence rule allows the victim to recover damages from a negligent 
injurer, even if the victim is negligent herself.  So in addition to (1) through (3), person 
X’s expected cost function (when both parties are negligent) is given by: 
If 
* x x <  and 
* y y < , then  L y x p   x L y x p x x CX ) , ( ) 1 ( ) ) , ( )( 1 ( α α α − + = + − + =    (4) 
Note that when facing a negligent counterpart, person X’s best response for 
minimizing her own expected cost may be either to take due care (Figure 1 (a) below), or 
to choose negligence (Figure 1 (b)).  
As shown in Figure 1 (b), if α  is sufficiently high, there may exist care levels for X 
such that the condition 
* ) ~ , ( ) 1 ( x L y x p x < − + α  holds. In this case, person X would take 
insufficient care (at x ~), given person Y’s choice of insufficient care (at  y ~).  
  
   (a) For 
* ~ y y y < = and                     (b) For 
* ~ y y y < = and 
     
* ] ) ~ , ( ) 1 ( [ x L y x p   x    min > − + α                       
* ] ) ~ , ( ) 1 ( [ x L y x p   x    min ≤ − + α  
       Expected Costs for Person X       
Figure 1: Expected Costs for Person X under Contributory Negligence When 
* y y <  
 Cx  Cx
 x       x* 
x + p(x, y*)L 
       x 
  x    x 
x* 
                       
                      ~  x + (1-α)p(x, y)L 
    ~      x 
x* 
x + p(x, y*)L 
x* 
                      
                      ~  x + (1-α)p(x, y)L 
                      
~                ~  ~ 
x + (1-α)p(x, y)L  
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In short, the simple negligence rule under role-type uncertainty allows the 
possibility of inefficient equilibria, in which both parties are choosing negligent behavior.  
In addition to the efficient equilibrium at (
* *, y x ), the game has an inefficient equilibrium 
at ( y x ~ , ~ ), where 
* ~ x x < and 
* ~ y y < , if the following conditions are satisfied 
simultaneously: 
] ) ~ , ( 1 ( [ ~ L y x p )   x   min   arg x α − + =  and  ] ) , ~ ( ) 1 ( [ ~ L y x p   y   min   arg y β − + =     (5) 
* ) ~ , ~ ( ) 1 ( ~ x L y x p   x ≤ − + α                          (6) 
* ) ~ , ~ (   ) 1 ( ~ y L y x p y ≤ − + β                          ( 7 )  
The higher is α  [β ], the higher is the likelihood that condition (6) [(7)] is met.  
The intuition behind conditions (6) and (7) is straightforward.  Under the simple liability 
rule, if both parties are failing the standard of care, each thinks that she will bear no 
accident costs if she is the victim, but will bear all accident costs if she is the injurer.    
Therefore, if a party believes that the possibility of her being a victim is quite high, she 
heavily discounts the accident losses that are placed on her when she is the injurer.  As a 
result, she may choose negligently low care expenditures.   
For instance, suppose that party X is sure that she will be the victim, and that Y is 
also (i.e.,  1 = = β α ).  In this case, the simple negligence game has two Nash equilibria; 
(0,0) and (
* *, y x ).  One possible outcome here is an inefficient equilibrium, where neither 
party takes any precaution. 
Lemma 3 below gives a necessary condition for the existence of an inefficient 
equilibrium, in terms of the sum of two subjective victimization probabilities. 
Lemma 3.  1 > + β α   is a necessary condition for the simple negligence rule to 
produce an inefficient equilibrium under role-type uncertainty. 
Proof.  Assume to the contrary.  By adding together inequalities (6) and (7), we have 
* * ) ~ , ~ ( )) ( 2 ( ~ ~ y x L y x p y x + ≤ + − + + β α . But since 
* x and 
* y solve the total social 
cost minimization problem,  L y x p y x L y x p y x y x ) ~ , ~ ( ~ ~ ) , (
* * * * * * + + ≤ + + < + .  If 




2.3   Contributory Negligence  
Under the rule of negligence with contributory negligence as a defense, the negligent 
injurer is liable for accident losses unless the victim is also negligent, in which case the 
burden falls on the victim. When both are negligent, each bears her own losses, i.e., her 
losses when she is the victim. So in addition to equations (1) through (3), person X’s 
expected cost function (when both parties are negligent) is now given by: 
If 
* x x <  and 
* y y < , then  L y x p   x x L y x p x CX ) , ( ) 1 ( ) ) , ( ( α α α + = − + + =        (8) 
By the same logic that was used in the preceding section, we can derive conditions for the 
existence of an inefficient equilibrium at ( y x ~ , ~ ), where 
* ~ x x < and 
* ~ y y < : 
] ) ~ , ( [ ~ L y x p x   min   arg x α + =  and  ] ) , ~ ( [ ~ L y x p y   min   arg y β + =                  (9) 
* ) ~ , ~ ( ~ x L y x p   x ≤ +α                                       (10) 
* ) ~ , ~ ( ~ y L y x p   y ≤ + β                                     (11) 
Like the simple negligence rule, the contributory negligence rule does not 
necessarily lead to an efficient outcome under role-type uncertainty.  Since the accident 
costs fall on the victim when both are negligent, the contributory negligence rule is likely 
to produce an insufficient-care-equilibrium when both parties believe they have high 
probabilities of becoming an injurer, that is, low probabilities of becoming a victim.  
Based on the same logic used in the proof of Lemma 3, we have the following: 
Lemma 4.  1 < + β α   is a necessary condition for the contributory negligence rule 
to produce an inefficient equilibrium under role-type uncertainty. 
Lemma 4 makes it clear why Arlen (1990) and Wittman et al. (1997) conclude that 
efficiency is guaranteed under the contributory negligence rule.  In their bilateral risk 
models, both parties suffer losses and each party’s expected loss function is separable and 
known to everyone.  Accordingly, the condition  1 = + β α   (in our context) is always 
satisfied, and the possibility of an insufficient-care-equilibrium is eliminated.   
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2.4   Comparative Negligence with Fixed Division 
In contrast with “all-or-nothing” rules like simple negligence or contributory negligence, 
the comparative negligence rule with fixed division splits accident damages between two 
negligent parties, in some fixed proportion.
8   Let  γ   denote the fraction of accident 
damages borne by the victim when both parties are negligent ( 1 0 < < γ ).  In particular, if 
2
1 = γ , this is “the equal division rule”.  The equal division rule was once the dominant 
doctrine in admiralty law, until it was replaced by the pure comparative negligence 
system.
9  
Under the comparative negligence rule with fixed division, person X’s expected 
cost function, when both parties are negligent, is given by: 
If 
* x x <  and 
* y y < , then  ) ) , ( ) 1 ( )( 1 ( ) ) , ( ( L y x p x L y x p x CX γ α γ α − + − + + =  
   L y x p x ) , ( )] 1 ( ) 1 2 [( α γ α − + − + =               (12) 
Now equation (12), combined with equations (1) through (3), fully describe person X’s 
expected cost function under the fixed division rule.   
It is easy to see that this rule may not exclude the possibility of an insufficient-care-
equilibrium, for certain values of α ,β , and γ .  The conditions for the existence of an 
inefficient equilibrium at ( y x ~ , ~ ), where 
* ~ x x < and 
* ~ y y < , are given by: 
] ) , ( )) 1 ( ) 1 2 (( [ ~ L y x p x   min   arg x α γ α − + − + =  and 
                                                           
8 It needs to be emphasized that the loss-sharing property of the comparative negligence with fixed division 
rule works only as a “defense”.  So this rule is different from what Shavell (1987) defines as the rule of 
“strict division of accident losses”.  Strict division of accident losses implies that the fraction of losses 
borne by the injurer and the victim is assumed to be independent of their levels of care and, in particular, 
independent of whether someone was negligent.  It is straightforward that the strict division of accident 
losses does not provide each party with correct incentives of efficient care-taking in the standard model 
without role-type uncertainty. 
 
9 By about 1700 English courts were consistently applying the equal division rule in admiralty collision 
cases.  This doctrine was replaced in 1911 in Great Britain by a statute providing for division of damages in 
proportion to the degree of fault of each vessel.  The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the equal division rule in 
1854, in a ship collision case, The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson (58 U.S. (17 how.) 170, 15L. Ed. 233).  
In turn, the equal division rule was replaced by the pure comparative negligence rule in U.S. admiralty  
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] ) , ( )) 1 ( ) 1 2 (( [ ~ L y x p y   min   arg y β γ β − + − + =                             (13) 
* ) ~ , ~ ( )] 1 ( ) 1 2 [( ~ x L y x p x ≤ − + − + α γ α                   (14)    
* ) ~ , ~ ( )] 1 ( ) 1 2 [( ~ y L y x p y ≤ − + − + β γ β                     (15)   
However, note that if 2
1 = γ , the role-type uncertainty parameters α and β  




1 ) ~ , ~ ( ~ x L y x p x ≤ +  and 
*
2
1 ) ~ , ~ ( ~ y L y x p y ≤ + , respectively.  But these two conditions 
cannot be satisfied simultaneously, because adding the two inequalities together yields 
* * ) ~ , ~ ( ~ ~ y x L y x p y x + ≤ + + , which is not possible since  ) , (
* * y x   is a unique TSC 
minimizing optimum.  Therefore, the equal division rule guarantees efficiency.  This is an 
intuitive result, since among the set of all fixed division rules, the equal division rule is 
the only one that makes one party’s expected cost, assuming both parties are negligent, 
independent of her role-type.   
With the exception of the equal division rule, all fixed division rules allow the 
possibility of insufficient-care-equilibria. By logic similar to that used in the proof of 
Lemmas 3, we can derivr necessary conditions for such equilibria: 
Lemma 5.  With role-type uncertainty, if there exists an inefficient equilibrium 
under the comparative negligence rule with fixed division, one of the following two 
conditions is satisfied: (i)  1 > + β α  and  2
1 < γ , or (ii)  1 < + β α  and  2
1 > γ . 
Lemma 5 makes it clear that, as with simple negligence and contributory negligence, 
inefficient outcomes may occur under the fixed division rule, but do not occur if 
1 = + β α .  By comparing the conditions for inefficient outcomes derived so far, we can 
compare simple negligence, contributory negligence, and comparative negligence with 
fixed division (except 50:50 split) in terms of social efficiency.  We find that (i) if 
1 = + β α , then all three rules are efficient, and (ii) if  1 ≠ + β α , then none of these three 
rules guarantees efficiency, and, furthermore, none dominates the others on efficiency 
grounds. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
cases as a result of a 1975 U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co. (421 U.S. 397, 
44 L. Ed. 2d 251, 95 S. Ct. 1708).  See Keeton et al. (1984) and Schwartz (1994).  
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2.5   Pure Comparative Negligence 
The pure comparative negligence rule splits accident damages between two negligent 
parties according to their degrees of fault.  In the context of continuous care models, the 
proportions of accident damages persons X and Y should bear are generally defined using 
the ratio of each party’s deviation from her due care level.  That is, X’s degree of fault is 
most naturally measured by 






, and similarly for Y’s. 
Now, in addition to (1) through (3), person X’s expected cost function when both 
parties are found negligent is given by:  
If 
* x x <  and 
* y y < ,  
then  ) ) , ( ( * *
*
L y x p
y y x x
x x
x CX − + −
−
+ =α ) ) , ( )( 1 ( * *
*
L y x p





+ − + α  
= L y x p
y y x x
x x




+                 ( 1 6 )  
Note that when both take less than due care, each party’s expected cost is 
completely independent of the role-type uncertainty parameters α  and β .  When both 
are negligent, one party’s damage share depends only on her own care level, the given 
* *, y x , and the other party’s care level.  As before, the social optimum (
* *, y x ) is a well-
defined Nash equilibrium under the pure comparative negligence rule.  Furthermore, we 
can now show that it is a unique equilibrium of the game:  Suppose to the contrary that 
there exists another equilibrium ( y x ~ , ~ ), where 
* ~ x x < and 
* ~ y y < .  Then, at ( y x ~ , ~ ), the 




) ~ , ~ ( ~ ~
~
~ x L y x p









) ~ , ~ ( ~ ~
~
~ y L y x p





+                     ( 1 8 )  
Adding the above two inequalities together yields  
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* * ) ~ , ~ ( ~ ~ y x L y x p y x + ≤ + +                      ( 1 9 )  
But condition (19) contradicts the fact that (
* *, y x ) is the TSC minimizing optimum, 
since  L y x p y x L y x p y x y x ) ~ , ~ ( ~ ~ ) , (
* * * * * * + + ≤ + + < +  . 
In conclusion, the pure comparative negligence rule guarantees efficiency even with 
role-type uncertainty, as long as the standards of care are set equal to the socially efficient 
levels.  Since the pure comparative negligence rule splits liability between negligent 
parties according to each party’s degree of fault, it makes the accident loss division 
independent of one’s role-type.  Whatever beliefs each party has regarding the probability 
of being the victim or the injurer are completely beside the point.  No matter what α  and 
β    are, the pure comparative negligence rule always produces the socially optimal 
outcome as the unique equilibrium of the game.  Our main findings so far are 
summarized in: 
Proposition 1.  Suppose that the standard of care for each party is set at the 
socially optimal level.  In the standard tort model, with role-type uncertainty, under 
which each party forms a subjective belief regarding her probability of becoming 
an injurer or a victim:  
(i)   If  1 = + β α , all the negligence rules we have examined guarantee efficiency. 
(ii) In general, if  β α +   is not constrained at 1, then the pure comparative 
negligence rule and the equal division rule both guarantee efficiency; 
(iii) However, the rules of simple negligence, contributory negligence, and 
comparative negligence with fixed division (other than the 50:50 split) all 
produce the possibility of an inefficient equilibrium in which both parties take 
less than due care.  Among these three rules, no rule dominates others in terms 
of efficiency. 
3   AN APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO VEHICLE SIZE 
At this stage we add another dimension to the analysis by relating α  and β  to vehicle 
size.  With the burgeoning use of SUV’s and pickup trucks as passenger vehicles in 
recent years, it has become apparent that many people may be choosing large vehicles to 
reduce the likelihood that, in the event of a collision, they will be victims.  If your GM 
Hummer or Lincoln Navigator collides with a Honda Civic, whose vehicle is totaled?  
More important, whose children go to the hospital?  The auto companies don’t advertise  
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it explicitly,  but it’s implicit:  Drive our big SUV, and you’ll walk away from the crash; 
the guy in the other car will be carried to the hospital.  White (2003) provides data about 
the external effects created by vehicle size and the failure of negligence-based liability 
rules to solve this externality problem; the modeling below is in the same spirit. 
  We now assume that there is a one-dimensional property that is chosen by each of 
our two parties, which we call “size.”  (In reality, motor vehicles have a number of 
characteristics that impact on the probability that their occupants will be victims or 
injurers, including weight, height of center of gravity, bumper height, horsepower, body 
reinforcements, airbags, and so on.) 
  We assume that size is measured from 0 (smallest) to 1 (largest).  We assume that 
person X chooses size s, and that person Y chooses size t.  We assume that the following 
victimization probability rule governs, and that all parties are aware of it: 
 If  X and Y are involved in an accident, and  ) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( ≠ t s  the probabilities of each 









= β                          (20) 





fraction of total vehicle weight comprised by X’s vehicle. The big cars rule!  To complete 
the specification of the victimization probabilities, we assume that if  ) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( = t s , the 
probabilities are both  2
1 .  (The model is easy to extend to the case where, if  ) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( = t s , 
the victimization probabilities are two non-zero constants summing to 1.) 
  Case 1.  As a first simple case, assume that X and Y have fixed, pre-determined 
vehicle sizes, known to both, and that they are choosing care levels x and  y , subject to 
one of the negligence-based rules analyzed above. Given the victimization probability 
rule of equation (20), it must be the case that  1 = + β α , and under our current 
assumptions, both parties know it.  Therefore, under Lemmas 3, 4, and 5 above, no matter 
which negligence-based rule is in effect, the unique Nash equilibrium care levels are at 
) , (
* * y x .  
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 When  ) , (
* * y x  is the Nash equilibrium, both parties are taking adequate care, and 
therefore under all the negligence-based rules examined, all of the accident losses fall on 
the accident victim.  We conclude, therefore, that the bottom line for all costs for party X 
is now: 
  L y x p  
t s
t
x CX ) , (
* * *
+
+ =           ( 2 1 )  
  Case 2.  Next we assume that party X takes party Y’s vehicle size t as given, and is 
able to choose her own vehicle size s.  We let r  represent the cost per unit of vehicle 
size, so that a vehicle of size s costs rs.  (Realistically, of course, size is one vehicle 
characteristic whose cost is added to the costs of other vehicle characteristics.  We are 
assuming that the choice of a minimally-sized vehicle adds  0 r   to the vehicle cost, 
whereas choosing the maximally-sized vehicle adds  1 r  to the cost.) 
  By the arguments above, any Nash equilibrium requires that the care levels be at 
the efficient  ) , (
* * y x .   
  Anticipating a Nash equilibrium in the care levels at  ) , (
* * y x , and deciding what 
sized vehicle to choose, party X wants to choose s to minimize 
  rs L y x p  
t s
t
x rs CX +
+
+ = + ) , (
* * *  
The first order condition for a minimum leads easily to 










* * ) , (           ( 2 2 )  
  Case 3.  Now assume that both parties, X and Y, are minimizing expected accident 
costs plus vehicle size costs, each taking the other’s (optimal) care as a given, and each 
taking the other’s vehicle size as a given.  Party X is solving equation (22), and party Y is 
solving an analogous equation.  It is then easy to show that the resulting vehicle size 
choices, 
* *,t s , are given by 
  L y x p
r
t s ) , (
4
1 * * * * = =          ( 2 3 )   
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Total expenditure on vehicle size is of course a pure social waste in this model, since it 
has no function other than to throw fixed damages on the other party in the event of an 
accident. We will call this social cost vehicle size social cost, and abbreviate it VSSC; it 
is of course an addition to the previously defined TSC, which only comprised care costs 
plus expected accident costs.  The vehicle size social cost is trivially derived from 
equation (23) above, as follows: 
 VSSC  =  L y x p rt rs ) , (
2
1 * * * * = +          ( 2 4 )  
Equation (24) suggests that the social waste produced by White’s (2003) “arms race” is 
quite substantial; in our model it amounts to half of the expected accident losses. 
  What policies might be adopted to reduce this loss?  As White (2003) indicates, 
vehicle size per se is not a negligence issue under the legal rules with which we are 
familiar.  However, in theory, it could be.  If the designer of a judicial system were to 
establish standards of care for both care levels x and  y , and vehicle sizes s and t, our 
model would proceed as follows:  Vehicle size costs would be added to the previously 
defined TSC, producing a redefined total social cost of: 
 TSC  =  rt rs L y x p y x + + + + ) , (.  
This is minimized at  ) 0 , ( ) , (
* x s x =  and  ) 0 , ( ) , (
* y t y = .  The court would set party X’s 
standard of care at  ) 0 , (
* x  and party Y’s standard of care at  ) 0 , (
* y .  Failure to meet either 
the care expenditure standard or the size standard would result in a party’s being found 
negligent. 
  Now consider whether or not party X would want to deviate from  ) 0 , (
* x , if party Y 
were at  ) 0 , (




1 = + = + β α , and the analysis of the previous sections goes through, with  ) 0 , (
* x  and 
) 0 , (
* y  comprising a Nash equilibrium under any of the negligence-based liability rules.  
However, X might be tempted to choose 
* x x =  and  0 > = ε s , in order to throw the 
accident damages on the other party.  But if she does so she becomes negligent, and 
under any of the negligence-based rules, all the damages get thrown back on her.    
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Therefore, she resists the temptation.  It is also clear that no Nash equilibrium would be 
possible if  party Y were at  ) , (
* t y , with  0 > t , because X would then choose  ) 0 , (
* x ; this 
would result in X, in the small vehicle, becoming the victim with probability 1,  but the 
damages would always be thrown back on Y, whose too-large vehicle makes her 
negligent. The results of this section to this point are summarized in: 
Proposition 2.  Suppose that parties X and Y choose both care-taking expenditures 
x and y, and vehicle sizes s and t.  Assume that their probabilities of being victims 
in accidents are given by equation (20) above, and are known to both parties. 
Assume that standards of care for x and y are set at the socially optimal levels.  
Under the rules of simple negligence, contributory negligence, comparative 
negligence with fixed division (other than the 50:50 split), equal division, and pure 
comparative negligence: 
(i)  If the court imposes no size standard, all the rules produce efficient Nash 
equilibria in terms of care-taking expenditures, but social waste from a vehicle 
size “arms race.” 
(ii) If the court also imposes a standard of care for size, at the optimal level of zero, 
all the rules produce efficient Nash equilibria in terms of care-taking 
expenditures and vehicle size. 
  The principal drawback of proposition  2’s positive second part is that it is only a 
faint theoretical possibility. It’s not likely that driving a large vehicle will ever be per se 
evidence of negligence, at least not where we live.  A more plausible possibility is a tax 
on vehicle size, which could be easy to implement (state motor vehicle departments 
already know our vehicle weights, and some states impose higher registration fees on 
heavier vehicles), and for which there are precedents. In the rest of this section we model 
such a tax. 
Case 4.  We continue to assume that both parties, X and Y, are minimizing expected 
accident costs plus vehicle size costs, each taking the other’s (optimal) care as a given, 
and each taking the other’s vehicle size as a given.  We assume that negligence is defined 
only in terms of xand  y .  We assume that there is an ad valorem tax τ  on vehicle size, 
and therefore the cost of a unit of vehicle size, inclusive of the tax, is  r ) 1 ( τ + .  We 
assume that each dollar of tax revenue produces a dollar’s worth of social value, so the 
tax itself does not create its own social loss.  The result is that each party replaces r with  
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r ) 1 ( τ + in her calculations regarding vehicle size to choose.  Equations (23) and (24) are 
replaced with the following: 
L y x p
r
t s ) , (
) 1 ( 4
1 * * * *
τ +
= = .          ( 2 5 )  
VSSC =  L y x p rt rs ) , (
) 1 ( 2
1 * * * *
τ +
= + .         ( 2 6 )  
The case 4 conclusion is this:  All the negligence-based liability rules produce 
efficient Nash equilibria in terms of care costs x and  y .  There remains a vehicle size 
“arms race” loss VSSC as shown in equation (26), but society can reduce this below any 
(positive) threshold by choosing the ad valorem size tax τ  large enough. 
4   CONCLUSION 
The recently published Restatement of the Law (Third), Torts focuses on the comparative 
responsibility system, reflecting the fact that all but four states (Alabama, Maryland, 
North Carolina, and Virginia) plus the District of Columbia, have adopted comparative 
negligence in place of the older contributory negligence rule.  Spurred by this major 
doctrinal switch in tort law, scholars of law and economics have actively looked for an 
efficiency gain from the switch.  The existing literature favoring the comparative 
negligence rule on efficiency grounds generally focuses on the characteristic of 
comparative negligence as a “sharing rule,” and contrasts it with the “all-or-nothing” 
feature of contributory negligence.
10 
In section 2 of this paper, we have focused on another aspect of comparative 
negligence that makes it superior to simple negligence, contributory negligence, or fixed-
division negligence (other than equal division), namely the behavior of the rule under 
                                                           
10 Cooter and Ulen (1986) and Haddock and Curran (1985) argue that comparative negligence is superior to 
contributory negligence under “evidentiary uncertainty”.  They contend that when courts make errors in 
evaluating care levels, over-precaution caused by evidentiary uncertainty is less under comparative 
negligence than it is under other negligence-based rules.  Rubinfeld (1987) and Emons (1990) introduce 
heterogeneity in individual’s care-taking costs.  They show that a properly designed sharing rule can 
improve on all-or-nothing type negligence rules.  But recently, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2003) critique 




11   We have shown that when each party enters the game with a 
subjective belief regarding the probability that she will be the victim (or the injurer), and 
the victimization probabilities do not sum to 1, only pure comparative negligence and the 
equal division rule guarantee social efficiency, while the rules of simple negligence, 
negligence with contributory negligence, and comparative negligence with fixed division 
other than 50:50, all allow the possibility of inefficient equilibria.  Since the pure 
comparative negligence rule splits liability between negligent parties according to each 
party’s degree of fault, it makes the accident loss division independent of one’s role-type 
– victim or injurer.  We have shown that this often-overlooked characteristic implies that 
comparative negligence has a significant advantage over other rules in terms of social 
efficiency. 
In section 3 of this paper we have extended our model to reflect the “arms race” in 
vehicle size, since vehicle size is an important factor in the determination of victimization 
probabilities.  We find that in this extension of the model, where the assumptions imply 
that 1 = + β α  must hold, all of the standard negligence-based liability rules we have 
analyzed produce efficient care levels, but all result in another kind of inefficiency, 
because vehicles are too large.  We find that if the notion of negligence could be 
broadened to encompass vehicle size, the vehicle size “arms race” inefficiency could be 
erased, and we also find that, without broadening the notion of negligence, a vehicle size 
tax could be used to mitigate the inefficiency. 
                                                           
11 Wittman et al. (1997) claim that the prevalence of comparative negligence is directly associated with the 
fact that automobile accidents have come to dominate the tort system.  The superiority of comparative 
negligence under role-type uncertainty may be interpreted as a supporting evidence for this claim.  
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1.   For the purposes of the proofs of lemmas 1 and 2 we will assume 
that  1 0 < <α and 1 0 < < β ; the arguments when α  orβ  equal 0 or 1 are obvious. 
Given that person Y satisfies her due care exactly (i.e.,
* y y = ), person X’s 
expected cost function is given by (1) and (2): 
         L y x p x CX ) , (  
* α + = , if 
* x x ≥ ; 
                     L y x p x ) , (
* + = , if 
* x x < . 
By definition,  ] ) , ( [
* * L y x p x   min   arg x + = .  Also,  ] ) , ( [
* * L y x p   x   min   arg x α + >  
holds, since  0 > xx p .  Hence, as Figure 2 (a) below shows, X’s expected cost function 
for 
* y y =  jumps down at the due care level 
* x , and then increases following the line 
L y x p x CX ) , (  
* α + = .  As a result, given that Y  satisfies her due care exactly 
(i.e.,
* y y = ), person X’s best response is to choose 
* x .  By the same logic, person Y’s 
best response to 
* x x =  is to choose 
* y .  Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 2.  Suppose to the contrary that Y chooses 
* y y > . Since  0 > xy p , 
] ) , ( [
* L y x p x   min   arg x + > .  Figures 2 (b) and (c) below show the two possible 
graphs of person X’s expected cost function when Y has chosen 
* y y > .   If 
L y x p   x L y x p x   min ) , ( ] ) , ( [
* * α + > +  holds (Figure 2 (b)), person X will choose 
* x , 
in response to the given  y .  However, ( y x ,
* ) is not an equilibrium, since by Lemma 
1 person Y’s best response to 
* x  is to choose 
* y . 
Figure 2 (c) shows the case where  L y x p x L y x p x ) , (   ] ) , ( [ min 
* * α + ≤ + . In this 
case X may want to take less care than due care in response to Y’s choice of y .   To 
show that this is also not an equilibrium, it suffices to observe that Y would always 
prefer 
* y to  y  if person X chooses 
* ~ x x < .  By reducing her care level from  y  to 
* y , 
person Y still escapes liability, while saving the care cost difference. 
We conclude that for any Nash equilibrium choice of y, 
* y y ≤ must hold. By the 
same logic, 











 (a) For  
* y y =                    (b) For 
* y y y > = and                 (c) For 
* y y y > = and 
                                   L y x p   x L y x p x   min ) , ( ] ) , ( [
* * α + > +              L y x p   x L y x p x   min ) , ( ] ) , ( [
* * α + ≤ +  
 
Figure 2: Expected Costs for Person X (Shown in Bold), When 
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